Public report!ng burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. The US military has found it very difficult for its traditional hierarchies to fight against terrorist networks in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part because it continues to rely on the same Industrial Age model of command and control that was shaped by its experiences in World War II. Today, tens of thousands of warfighters are digitally linked, with better firepower, communications, and intelligence than the military had 20 years ago, yet the C2 model has not evolved. The military has built itself around a 20th Century model designed for efficiency and control that does not match with 21st Century complexity. These innovations and challenges effect no one more than the commander, with deep repercussions for his ability to command and control. The current Marine Corps command and control model is outdated and, while still effective, is falling short of its full potential. While the hierarchical organization may be more efficient, a networked organization can better adapt to the changes seen in today's environment.
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15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report. control that does not match with 21st Century complexity. These innovations and challenges effect no one more than the commander, with deep repercussions for his ability to command and control. The current Marine Corps command and control model is outdated and, while still effective, is falling short of its full potential. While the hierarchical organization may be more efficient, a networked organization can better adapt to the changes seen in today's environment.
Since the Industrial Revolution and Frederick Taylor's "Scientific Management," business and military organizational culture has been dominated by a system that is excellent for achieving highly efficient execution of known, repeatable processes.2 Historically, the military's response to new technology has always been greater centralized control. Unfortunately, greater centralized control is the exact opposite of what is necessary to succeed on the current battlefield.
The Marine Corps must evolve its thinking on command and control in today's informationdominated environment, and adaptability, not WWII efficiency, must become the focus.
Change is never easy, particularly in an organization that has been as successful as the subordinates, but empowerment without context will lead to disaster. 5 This context, the knowledge and intelligence throughout the organization, comes from developing a shared consciousness. Shared consciousness is true transparency through the entire organization, with each of the elements having an unobstructed view into the rest of the organization. 6 While the power of the MAGTF is greater than the sum of its parts, it has not achieved shared consciousness and empowered execution as an agile, adaptive force.
To fully change the Marine Corps mindset on C2, it must move away from the traditional line and block charts and the reductionism approach of the past century when looking at problems. Leaders must look at their organization from a perspective informed more by the biological sciences than the physical sciences. This is about the process of decision making and the behaviors involved in the decision making process. Anne Murray Allen, former head of IT and strategy for Hewlett-Packard, and Dennis Sandow, Univ. of Oregon, teamed up on a study on social network analysis for organizations in the modern age. They wrote, "As the philosophy of the physical sciences dominated the Industrial Age, the philosophy of the biological sciences is beginning to dominate the Knowledge Age. This philosophy views knowledge, people and organizations as living systems ... [which represents a shift from] (1) focusing on patis to focusing on the whole, (2) focusing on categorization to focusing on integration." 7 The Marine
Corps' current industrial models have worked wonders both for business and for the military as far as efficiency. They were ideal for effective, efficient use of resources and have sent men to the moon as well as ensuring that we had an effective operational structure for WWII. However, the speed and interconnectedness of the battlefield has changed,. and to defeat networked terrorism and cyber threats and to wage conventional warfare, these insufficient management models must change. Smaller threats can connect in real time to outmaneuver our more powerful, vastly better equipped and trained forces. Understanding that the hierarchical, top-down headquarters will fight to make itself more efficient, the Marine Corps must shift its operational model in order to be more adaptive and better prepared for change. 8 The MEF must break down its current "silos of excellence" and the isolated effo1is among its staff sections and major subordinate elements. The Division, Logistics Group, and
Wing are inwardly focused and often find themselves facing a prisoner's dilemma within the MAGTF with regard to resources. The MEF headquatiers, with its expertise and experience, must become a truly networked organization, encouraging inclusion, shared expe1iise, diversity, and shared consciousness across the MAGTF to truly harness the abilities of the team. It also must become more transparent and create a culture that can enable the three arms of the MAGTF to execute on solutions to complex problems. The failure to do so comes at the expense of the relevancy of the Marine Corps in relation to the other armed services. The current structure and hierarchy that exist in the MEF HQ, amongst the MSEs, and across the Marine Corps, must evolve so the MAGTF can reach its full potential given today's technology and capabilities.
Today's leaders must fight to change the staff to allow for better information flow, coordination, and execution on the battlefield. The goal is clear; the challenge is how to implement it. The
Marine Corps must evolve as a thinking organization before it can simply change its structure, but the foundation for this evolved command and control model will be in leadership through education. Normandy and the broad front attack on Ge1many. These great commanders did not stray from the nature of warfare, but rather adapted their organizations and leadership to the enemy and the context in which they were fighting. The Marine Corps must do the same. While Marine leaders cannot change the culture of the organization overnight, they can lay a framework to educate leadership, with a firm understanding of the context within which they will likely operate, so they can understand the changes required by warfighting command and control and can adapt when necessary.
Steps to Evolve Commanders for Modern Command and Control

" ... to instruct its members through the exchange of ideas in all areas
Step 1. Leadership Development and Education
The Marine Corps has traditionally prided itself on its ability to adapt and overcome in any situation. The Marine Corps needs leaders who can adapt to change and be critical thinkers.
These educated leaders need to understand how to build effective and adaptive teams at the operational and enterprise level of the Marine Corps, and not just at the tactical level, which tends to be the focus. This is particularly important as it faces an information-dominated battlefield. The devefopment process for the Marine Corps' officers has changed only slightly since the end of the Cold War; while there is a dedicated Professional Military Education (PME)
program that trains and educates Marines based on their respective ranks, this program must be expanded from mere indoctrination to a rigorous course in critical thinking in order to develop better leaders able to adapt on the battlefield, particularly at the mid and senior levels.
Leadership is a common theme in all of the PME courses taught, yet leadership alone has not been broken out into its own field of study in Marine Corps PME. The competency-based approach to leadership development has merit, and it should be continued in these schools, but it is not sufficient for senior leaders to drive the required institutional changes. New techniques and information should be added to these courses and schools to better prepare Marine Corps leaders so that they are well armed for the future operating environment.
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Current Marine Corps PME does not introduce the leadership theories of transformational, empowered, and shared leadership, although they are practiced and required in the Marine Corps. The program is also critical toward organizational change and building a better C2 model. They aim to develop leaders in the resident schools, but they are failing to provide these future leaders with in-depth leadership education that would better prepare them for leading Marines and creating better organizations. While the PMEs have made an effort to include "leadership" in the curriculum, they fail to address the necessary components of leadership, specifically those leadership theories that could enhance leaders' abilities in the future operating environment.
Marine Corps officers must have the ability to not only lead their Marines but also to lead their superiors: it is a 360-degree effmi. 13 The bottom line is that leadership is not positional. It is everywhere and in every situation. With a shared purpose, clear understanding of the context, and clear end state, aiiiculated by the leader, subordinates have freedom of action to decide and evolve the situation to meet the described end state. The need for transformational, empowered, and shared leadership theory in Marine PME is of utmost imp01iance for Marine Corps operational leaders and their success in the current and future operating environment.
Shared leadership and situational awareness do not simply happen. It takes humble and educated leaders able to be aware of their organization and the context in which they are serving to set their organization on the right path. Being aware of limits, the decision making process, the behaviors of the organization, and the time necessary to make these decisions is critical. If
Marines are to change their organizational model from hierarchical to a more networked or weblike system, they must have educated leaders who can empower subordinates and who are able to develop the trust and competency necessary to adapt.
Step 2. Empowering Leadership
With growing technological capabilities throughout the battlefield, commanders are able to watch combat actions via live feed, monitor communication radio links, and communicate from the highest levels of command to the tactical edge and dictate the actions of subordinates.
Empowering leadership means more than just providing autonomy to ones' followers, it also "emphasizes the development of follower self-management or self-leadership skills." 14 This has also been referred to as "superleadership" by Doctors Manz and Sims in their study of leadership. 15 They saw self-management and self-leadership as the ultimate outcome of empowerment. The "empowering superleader educates the follower so that each learns how to act as a self-leader." Behaviors of empowered leadership include independent action, opportunity thinking, teamwork, self-development, participative goal setting, and self-reward. 17 Decentralized decision making enables authority, responsibility, and accountability down to the lowest level. Within a mission statement in the Marine Corps and the commanders' intent, the "how" is never stated.
The implication of this is that the subordinate is empowered to shape the mission. Leaders simply make it clear in their statement of "what they want done and who is to do it." While this may make commanders uncomfortable, this empowerment is required for the team to be successful, particularly in a large command. This concept of empowerment is critical for a networked organization and has significant impact on the ability of Marines to make informed decisions. More impmiantly, leaders who resist the urge to jump in simply because they can, who leave decisions to those further down the chain of command, will get equally good decisions d b . .
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an a etter orgarnzat10n.
Step 3. Shared Leadership
Another leadership theory that is critical to evolving Marine Corps C2 is shared . defined it as "distributed influence from within the team" and "lateral influence among peers."
Carson, Tesluk, and Marrone's study adds to the growing body of evidence that a team does well when it relies on leadership provided by the team as a whole rather than looking to a single individual to lead it.
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Shared leadership may be a hard concept to grasp in a hierarchical setting such as the Marine Corps. It is most likely to be found in voluntary or empowered teams. 21 Shared leadership may emerge from subordinate ranks and does not necessarily require a designated leader. This can be seen in highly effective staffs with an empowering commander or during decentralized execution with lateral communication amongst subordinate organizations.
Although the commander, or a ve1iical leadership model, still provides a significant role in developing and maintaining shared leadership, lateral influence amongst peers contributes to team effectiveness.
As technology progresses ever more rapidly, we need leaders with personal will, moral courage, and compassion who will work for the right solutions. Courage plays in to the ability to make independent, autonomous decisions and compassion ensures that outcomes are good for the team as opposed to the "covering your rear" attitude of hierarchical leadership. The leadership culture of the Marine Corps can be changed, but it must start with a strong educational foundation of shared and empowering leadership models. If the Marine Corps wants to move to a higher level of performance, this is where the investment must be made.
Step 4. Human Factors and Co-evolution in the Information Age
There is no doubt that changing an Industrial Age structure that has served the Marine Corps well in the past will be challenging. For example, in the past, the military has had Army four stars like Gen. Eisenhower who commanded six million American soldiers in WWII with the assistance of far smaller staffs than the services have today. Meanwhile, the services are
shrinking and yet the staffs are still growing to manage a smaller force. The evolution of command and control, coupled with technological integration, cannot be a separate planning effort but must be logically planned to enable an effective command and control model. The leadership of the Marine Corps will be fighting against a service culture and organizational structure that has been petrified in the form of the industrial model. The choice to shift the information, decision making, and control to shared and empowered human networks within the organization rather than relying on the traditional hierarchical model is necessary. 22 To be effective, the Marine Corps will need to adapt its organization, its doctrine, and its warfighting strategy. Command and control in the Information Age cannot.rest on outdated doctrine and structure that does not capture the tempo or complexity of the modern battlefield, let alone the battlefield of the future. Commanders can no longer allow formalized decisions to pass through bloated staffs and internal chains and get sidetracked. That process leads to a delayed decision that is no longer relevant and wastes the most impmiant resource, time. Leaders need to communicate their intent explicitly and develop trust in their followers' ability to make decisions that may affect the entire organization. It is very difficult for traditional hierarchies to fight against networks. It will take networks to fight networks, in both the digital and human domains.
The Marine Corps must adopt a more networked construct for command and control so that operationally it can adapt to an adaptive networked opponent. This C2 structure allows for the traditional control that commanders require, but it also enables the units in conflict to adapt, synthesize information, and rapidly take action when required. The challenge to the Marine Corps is to create a structure that can rapidly adapt to the low-end spectrum of conflict as well as the high end. They must codify this change in doctrine and craft a new strategy that allows the Marine Corps to enable commanders in the Information Age.
The Challenge for Commanders
The Futures Directorate of Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration has done a comprehensive study in an attempt to forecast probable futures that the country and Marine
Corps will face. These assessments paint a picture for commanders of a world that is more complex and interconnected and is competing for limited resources. In this environment, commanders will have to predict and find solutions in an environment of increased instability and will need to be more nuanced than their predecessors. An updated C2 structure will allow Marine commanders to adapt to this complex environment, ensuring that the right structure is being applied to the current problem. The paiis that make up complicated systems are known: one can look at the paiis, see how they connect, and predict with relative ce1iainty what will happen. Complexity, however, is when the number of interactions increases dramatically and the outcomes quickly become unpredictable. 26 Practically speaking, the main difference between complex and complicated systems is that one can usually predict the outcomes of complicated systems by knowing the staiiing point. In a complex system, that same starting conditions can produce different outcomes (think Lorenz and the butterfly effect with weather) depending on the interactions of the elements in the system. 27 Leaders are now faced with complex problems in which they are unable to understand the situation and they fail to predict the unintended consequences of their actions.
Marine Corps leaders must understand the complicated or complex situations in which they find themselves, and more importantly, they must align the organization to be better prepared to face this operating environment. A study of Citigroup's near financial collapse in 2008 found that their organization locked sectors of their business in "silos" and withheld information from employees that could have enabled leaders to make better decisions. This is strikingly similai· to the growing tendency of the staff sections at the major subordinate commands and MEF levels. The Citigroup study also pointed to a problem of "vantage point,"
i.e., when looking at complex situations, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for any singular leader to see an entire complex system. Science has proven that the world is producing more information than the human brain has the cognitive ability to recognize or integrate, and leaders faced with complex systems are relying on Industrial Age organizations to solve these problems, which has led to failure in both business and modem warfare. 28 Organizations have faced complicated problems in the past, but they were able to solve them by applying great effort and predicting the results. Now, with complex, networked, interconnected systems, increased effo1i on the part of organizations has not made the outcomes more predictable, despite the increase in technology. Because of this, the traditional concept of command and control, based on a reductionist managerial role for planning and prediction, must be updated. This "shared synchronization," "shared awareness," or "shared consciousness" challenges the traditional model of command and control, moving decision-maldng down the chain of command and providing Marines with unprecedented insights so they can act decisively. The abilities above are shared abilities and describe a state in the "cognitive domain when two or more entities are able to develop similar awareness of the situation." 30 Society and the battlefield have only become more complex, and so have the factors facing the Marine Corps and its leadership.
Conclusion
"If you can look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not, speak then unto me. "-From Macbeth, by William Shakespeare
The last 15 years of warfare have taught the Marine Corps many lessons and have exposed the damage that an asymmetrical threat that has networked itself can accomplish against a traditional military organization. Forecasting into the future, Marines will likely see an environment that will require more, not less, of its leaders. Through a change in the culture, leadership, and education system, and ultimately a change in the Marine Expeditionary Force, the Marine Corps can build a more resilient, adaptive, and networked team able to operate in the future operating environment. Marine leadership must recognize that the warfighting landscape has changed and that their current organization models are out of date. They must organize, educate, and train the force to meet this challenge.
The Marine Corps has a proud tradition of adapting to and overcoming challenges, and it has an opportunity to lead the DOD in a much needed overhaul of C2. The future environment will not allow the standard linear models, reductionism, or hierarchical organizations to be effective against America's adversaries. To be successful in this developing environment, Marines must evolve, educate, and develop more dynamic command and control relationships and leaders in the Marine Corps. Human factors and complex systems have come to dominate the world, the battlefield, and management models. The civilian sector and Marine Corps adversaries have evolved and the Marine Corps must evolve with them, developing organizations within organizations, with educated leaders who are able to critically think and adapt, so that they can understand the complexity they face and put the right structured force in a position to make the right decisions and win.
